The BPEL language formally specifies business processes and interaction protocols. Non-repudiation is a serious security issue in business transactions where any involved party denies having participated in a transaction. We propose and verify novel nonrepudiation protocols for business transactions and specify them in BPEL. Our proposed protocols fulfill the requirements of security, fairness, and timeliness.
Introduction
Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) for Web Services is a language for the formal specification of business processes and business interaction protocols [1] . Linking those web services together into a one large business process introduces a number of security problems. One of these problems is non-repudiation which means denial of having participated in a message exchange [2] . A numbers of protocols have been developed to solve non-repudiation where the messages are encrypted with a secret key and sent to the receiver.
To make the protocol fair, a Trusted Third Party (TTP) releases the key to the receiver. To eliminate the presence of TTP at the time of a dispute between the sender and receiver, the protocol needs to generate enough digital evidences for both the sender and the receiver. In this paper, we propose a number of nonrepudiation protocols for two-party and chain-linked business transactions involving web services. In our approach there is no need for the TTP to be available at the time of dispute. The proposed protocols are specified in BPEL to enable web services implementation and also because they provide security, accountability, fairness, timeliness and confidentiality. We use Petri Net theory to analyze the proposed nonrepudiation protocols.
Related Work
A detailed description of BPEL can be found in [1] . As for non-repudiation, there are two approaches. In general these protocols encrypt the message with a secret key and send it to the receiver and then the two parties exchange a delivery receipt and the message key to get the original message. An alternate approach is to involve a trusted third party that acts as a notary. Zhou [2] describes non-repudiation protocols in a number of scenarios between two entities where the sender and receiver don't necessarily play a fair role. In Zhou and Gollmann's fair protocol [3] , the protocol assumes that the sender, receiver and TTP are each equipped with their own private signature key and the related public verification keys and assumes that both parties will be able to retrieve the key from TTP. In the nonrepudiation message protocol for collaborative ebusiness [4] , the message is encrypted with secret key, which is generated at runtime. The sender sends a message encrypted with the secret key. That key is 'double-encrypted'. A non-repudiation protocol for chain-linked transactions is reported in [5] .
Secure Model for Web Services
There are two things to be considered for security.
• If messages contain confidential information, it is required that no one can read the original messages except the party to which it is sent.
• Two kinds of disputes can arise [5] . Repudiation of recipient arises when originator A claims having sent a message to recipient N, who denies having received it. Repudiation of origin arises when recipient N claims having received the message from the originator A, who denies sending it. We propose a protocol that protects the confidentiality of message contents such that no unauthorized intermediary is able to read the original message. Nonrepudiation is achieved by involving a TTP but this third party is not needed at the time of dispute. Furthermore, the third party cannot access the message sent between the business entities.
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We propose novel non-repudiation protocols between 2 parties as well as for a chain linked business transactions that may involve intermediate parties in different topologies. We also analyze the protocols for security and reliability. Furthermore, we specify these non-repudiation protocols in BPEL and Petri net models are used to verify the protocols.
We assume that web services within the organization can trust each other. A non-repudiation protocol is therefore required only when communication is between external services. Furthermore, we assume that the third party is not available at the time of dispute. Communication channels are assumed to be reliable.
BPEL uses WSDL to specify actions that should take place in a business process, and to describe the web services provided. There are ports in WSDL that must be associated with bindings, one of which is SOAP. We use the following notation [4] in this paper:
X | Y : concatenation of two messages X and Y. MD (X) : message digest value of message X. eK(X) : encryption of message X with key K. dK(X) : decryption of message X with key K sK(X) : digital signature of message X with private key K PA, SA : the public and private key of A. A B : X : A sends message X to B.
Secure model of 2-party transactions
We propose a secure model for transaction between a Buyer and a supplier. We involve a TTP to establish Non-repudiation between parties. An internal web service, which is an inventory manager, sends an order to replenish inventory to the buyer request process (figure 1) which interacts with the external web service. The steps executed between a buyer and a supplier. 1. Requester sends a purchase message M, which is encrypted with a key generated by the requester, as well as a double-encrypted key (generated key is first encrypted with the public key of the recipient and then with the public key of TTP) to the seller along with the dual signature (this is a signature on the message digest of the double encrypted key and message digest of the encrypted message). 2. Supplier receives the encrypted message and sends an acknowledgement receipt back to the requester after checking the integrity of the encrypted message (eK(M)) and the double-encrypted key by comparing with the dual signature. Supplier therefore confirms that it received the correct encrypted message contents before proceeding. 3. Supplier forwards the double-encrypted key to the TTP, along with its signature1 on the message digest of encrypted message to acknowledge the correct receipt of the encrypted message. Supplier is required to send this signature1 to the TTP in order to access the key. TTP stores the signature1 temporarily for signature distribution at the end of the protocol. 4. TTP decrypts the double-encrypted key using its private key and releases the encrypted key to the Supplier. The TTP then waits for acknowledgement from the supplier. 5. The supplier decrypts the encrypted key received from the TTP using its private key. It then sends signature2 on the message digest of the decrypted secret key to the TTP, as confirmation of receiving the key. The supplier creates the signature2 on the digested secret key so that TTP cannot access any key information from the signature. 6. TTP sends the two signatures received in steps 3 and 5 to the sender. These signatures are the supplier's acknowledgement of receiving correct purchase message and secret key. 7. After processing the buyer's request, supplier sends the encrypted purchase acceptance message, along with double encrypted key and dual signature to Acceptance component of buyer.
Buyer
Acceptance process sends an acknowledgement receipt back to supplier. 9. This is same as step 3, but instead of supplier, this message is send by Buyer acceptance component to TTP. 10. TTP decrypt the double-encrypted key and release the encrypted key to the Buyer Acceptance component process. 11. The Buyer Receiver component sends signature to the TTP, the confirmation of receiving the key same as in step 5. 12. The protocol ends with TTP forwarding both signatures to seller. There are 12 messages. We can reduce it to 10 by removing step 2 and 8 and use step 6 and 12 as acknowledgments.
Space limitations prevent a full BPEL specification and an outline is shown below. WSDL definitions for the processes, starting with Buyer.wsdl is created. This web service allows replenishing the inventory by placing an order. There are three messages, a request for purchase order, acknowledgment receipt of the request, and signature from TTP. Service links are used to define the capabilities of partners in the BPEL process. A partner is linked to a portType and also a set of operations in the WSDL file using those service links. Similarly there is the Request Component of Buyer: This process takes the request from an inventory manager and sends request with double-encrypted key to the supplier. In the final step it receives signatures from TTP. There are three partners of the buyer request process -inventory manager, Supplier and TTP. We first define partners and containers to store data. The BPEL process at the buyer is BUYERrequest.bpel. It is layered on top of the BUYER.wsdl file. In this process, after defining the partners and containers of the process, we specify the BPEL activities of the process starting with the sequence activity.
Request process
Begin sequence
• Receive a request from Inventory Manager and deposit it in the request container.
• Assign data from request container to container to be sent to supplier.
• Invoke a "place purchase order" request with supplier based on data stored in the pervious step.
• Assign acknowledgement received from supplier to container being sent to Inventory Manager.
• Reply to Inventory Manager with the response from supplier.
• Receive signatures from trusted third party showing that supplier has accessed the original message. End sequence Note: Receive, Invoke, Reply, and Assign etc. are BPEL activities. Supplier Process: The sequence of activities of BPEL process at supplier is as follows:
• Receive Request from Buyer Request process.
• Assign a receipt message in the container that is used in the reply activity.
• Reply to Buyer Request process.
• Assign encrypted message and double encrypted key in the container that used in the invoke activity.
• Invoke TTP process and send Double-encrypted key and signature1.
• After receiving key from TTP again invoke TTP process to send signature2.
• After processing order send order status to Buyer Acceptance process by invoke.
• Finally, receives signatures of buyer receive process from TTP. End sequence Acceptance Component of Buyer. The second BPEL process at BUYER has following sequence.
Begin sequence
• Receive Acceptance from Supplier.
• Reply to supplier with receipt acknowledgement.
• Invoke TTP to decrypt double encryption key and send signature1 (on the message digest of original message and dek), and to get the encrypted key.
• Invoke the TTP to send the signature2 (on the digested key) after accessing original message. End sequence
TTP Process
Begin sequence • Receive Request and signature1 from supplier process to decrypt the key.
• Reply to request from supplier process.
• Receive signature2 from supplier process.
• Invoke Buyer Request process to send signatures of supplier process.
• Receive request and signature1 from Buyer Acceptance process to decrypt the key.
• Reply to request from Buyer Acceptance process.
• Receive signature2 from Buyer Acceptance process.
• Invoke Supplier process to send the signatures of the Buyer Acceptance process. End sequence Because messages can be modified business process implementation should use WS-Security (web service security). It provides security by keeping security information in the SOAP part of the message. WS-security does not provide fairness and accountability. To fulfill such requirements there is a need to use the fair non-repudiation protocol. A sequence activity is represented hierarchically and can be refined into a number of lower level activities such as invoke, receive etc. BPEL Models of each process are merged to obtain a system-wide view a complete web business transaction. Although the individual models may display the desired properties of livness, safeness and complete termination, the merged net may not display such properties. To draw the Petri net of B2B processes, global information of the processes are required. Each process is only aware of itself and other web services (or BPEL processes) it calls. The entire business transaction can be therefore modeled by merging the models of individual transactions. When a process or web service needs to be invoked, its respective WSDL file is traced. A WSDL file has all the information required to communicate. The complete Petri net represents all the possible execution paths of the whole system, in our case inventory manager's web method (web services) is followed by the WSDL and then the web service and then WSDL of process and so on. Space limitations prevent a detailed Petri Net representation.
Secure model for chain of transactions
The protocol presented in Section 3.1 established non-repudiation between two individual parties. However, business transactions are rarely so simple, and may involve more parties in many different topologies. There is a need for non-repudiation in such environments. We consider here a chain-linked business transaction. Assume a supplier (X) wants to publish details about a new product (say a bar of soap). He publishes the information to a public Market Place such as Transora. Transora gets the information from a lot of suppliers. Retailer (X) sells soap and wants to know when new soap products are available. Retailer (X) has relationship with UCCnet. UCCnet sends information to a lot of retailers. The flow is modeled as:
There are a number of security issues: How can Retailer(X) be guaranteed that the information he received is indeed from Supplier(X)? Or how can Supplier(X) be guaranteed that Retailer(X) did actually get the new product detail? We propose a novel nonrepudiation protocol for chain linked business transactions. Non-repudiation in a chain linked system is modeled as follows. A N Intermediate businesses (B, C …) can read message, modify it or add their own information. In this paper we only consider case 1. Please refer to [6] for case 2. Step 2: A encrypts the id-message with public key of TTP and sends it to TTP. A TTP : t_id | ePTTP(id_message) Step 3: Now suppose an intermediate node B tries to get the key by sending it's own id message dSB(id_N') (it is not same as id_N). B TTP : t_id | dSB( id_N') The TTP will not accept because id_message is not equal to id_message it received in step 2 from A.
Step 4: TTP B : t_id | Negative acknowledgement Consider messages with recipient N. First the recipient N uses the message digests to ensure the message has not been trampled with (using treble signature ts) and it then needs to identify itself to the TTP.
Step 5: id_N is first decrypted at N using the private key of N: dSN(id_N) to get id_message. It is next encrypted using public key of the TTP and sent to TTP. TTP N : t_id | ek_from_TTP Where, ek_from_TTP = dSTTP(dek): decryption of dek using private key of TTP.
Step 9: The recipient N sends his signature2 on a digested secret key to the TTP. N TTP : t_id | sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) Step 10: TTP sends both signatures to the originator A. TTP A : t_id | sSN(t id | md1 | md3 ) | sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) We give an informal security analysis of our protocol.
• Intermediate nodes cannot get the key from the TTP because of id_N.
• Originator A knows that the recipient N gets the message because of md3 in the recipient N's signature.
• The originator A knows that message is correct because of md1 in the recipient N's signature.
• The originator A knows that the key is delivered correctly because of the signature of the recipient N on the digested secret key i.e. sSN(MD(ek_from_TTP)) .
• N know that this message is from the originator A by checking the integrity of the message using treble signature. It is the only sender that can generate that signature. The only way to read the message is through the secret key that encrypts the message. The secret key is double encrypted to prevent the intermediaries and TTP from getting access to the key and hence the original message. Timeliness -The Protocol achieves timeliness as each involved party can terminate the protocol at any time at their own judgment while maintaining fairness. For example, if the protocol terminates after step 1, the recipient N cannot take advantage because it cannot access the message even it gets the treble signature. Building the BPEL Processes Space limitations prevent a full BPEL specification of a secure model for a chain of business transactions. There will be BPEL specification for each intermediate node, the supplier A, buyer N and TTP (figure 2). Colored Petri Net Model We model the above protocol using colored Petri Nets. Such modeling allows us to verify and reason about the protocol. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed verification. Petri Nets allow verification of many properties of the protocol including fairness, liveness and deadlock properties, of the protocol. Each token color represents a web services transaction. The Petri net model can also be used to verify the security of the non-repudiation protocol for chain-linked Transactions. We show that if any transaction does not take place due to communication failures or node misbehavior, the protocol will terminate. We regard a colored Petri net as continuous time homogeneous Markov process [7] and we can analyze the system for security, fairness and liveness. The proof proceeds by 'unfolding' the Petri net for each token color. The model is a verified for a single color. An induction hypothesis is then used to prove that the model is valid for multicolored token petri net. The analyses further shows that in the colored Petri net, if the model is not secure, a transition may not fire properly due to misbehaving nodes. Fairness of the model is verified by showing that each transition that is enabled has an equal chance of firing. The liveness property can be verified by showing the final state of the model can be reached from any other valid state.
Dispute Resolution

Conclusions
In this paper we propose non-repudiation protocols for 2-party and chain linked web services transactions where the trusted third party signature is not considered as evidence; therefore TTP availability is not required at the time of dispute resolution. Protocols were analyzed so that they fulfill the security and nonrepudiation requirements in efficient manner. We proposed Petri nets to validate the flow of protocols. The secure web services flow is modeled using BPEL.
In multiple entity non-repudiation protocols the number of originators and recipients may vary. As the number increase this can affect performance and availability. Performance improvement is one area for further work. Modeling of attacks on web services is another area for further research. Since the proposed protocols are based on the assumption of reliable communication channel, protocol independent of reliable communication channels is needed.
